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Abstract 
Behaviour on even simple experimental games shows considerable individual 
differences, but previous attempts to link these preferences to stable personality traits 
have had mixed results. Here we address three limitations of earlier studies, namely: 
1) uncertainties concerning the reliability of preferences; 2) use of personality 
instruments with limited cross-study comparability; and 3) confounds where more 
than one psychological motive can lead to a particular choice. Sixty-seven participants 
completed 12 distinct real-money games twice over a two-week interval along with 6 
measures concerning their expectations about other players’ choices. Personality was 
measured using the full NEO-PI-R. Choices were highly stable across time (r = .84). 
Moreover, choices on the 12 games and 6 expectations reflected a single underlying 
dimension of “prosocial orientation”, measuring concern for the payoffs received by 
other players. Scores on the prosocial orientation dimension were related to 
personality, with openness, (low) neuroticism, and (low) extraversion retained as 
significant predictors. 
 
Keywords: Personality; Big Five; Social preferences; Dictator game; Experimental 
economics; Decision-making; Economic psychology
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1. Introduction 
According to Binmore (2007), “A game is being played whenever people have 
anything to do with each other” (p. 3). As used in research, games are generally run in 
2-player laboratory settings. In a typical dictator game, a dictator is endowed with a 
fund from which they must choose some amount (from 0% to 100%) to give to the 
recipient. The variable under study is the percent offered by the dictator. Multiple 
variations of such games have been developed: For instance, in the ultimatum game 
the recipient can choose to accept or reject the offer (in the case of rejection neither 
player receives anything). 
Research has revealed considerable individual differences in social 
preferences on these simple games (defined here as preferences over the distribution 
of resources between individuals; Camerer, 2003). One candidate in explaining these 
important differences is personality, where prima-facie associations, such as links of 
agreeableness to empathy and cooperation (Jensen-Campbell & Graziano, 2001), 
suggest associations with benevolent social preferences. However, studies testing 
these associations have reported mixed results (e.g. Kurzban & Houser, 2001).  
Here we present a study of the influences of personality on social preferences 
taking into account three possible limiting factors in previous research, namely: 1) the 
existence of inherent confounds within certain games used in prior research, such that 
identical behaviours can reflect distinct underlying motivations; 2) the limited 
comparability of personality instruments used in previous research; and 3) the 
possible low-stability of social preferences. Next we briefly introduce previous work 
examining relationships between personality and social preferences, before describing 
limitations in previous research in more detail, and, finally, presenting a study that 
addresses these limitations. 
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1.1 Individual differences in social preferences 
It has long been argued that individual differences are likely to play at best a  
trivial role in determining social preferences (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977), though 
personality has been linked to retaliation (Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999) and to 
preferences over allocations (Schmitt, Neumann, & Montada, 1995), both of which 
are intimately related to social preferences. Recent studies, however, have begun to 
explore trait dispositions underlying variation in economic behaviour generally 
(Borghans et al., 2008) in game behaviour specifically. For example, Hirsh and 
Peterson (2009) found that the withdrawal aspect of neuroticism (tapping fear and 
insecurity) and the enthusiasm aspect of extraversion (tapping positive affect and 
sociability) from the Big Five aspect scale (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007) 
independently predicted a greater likelihood of cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma 
game (β = -.14, -.12, respectively). By contrast, Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, and Walkowitz 
(2011) found that low neuroticism and high Openness to Experience predicted more 
cooperative transfers. Using the dictator game paradigm, Ben-Ner, Kong, and 
Putterman (2004) reported significant associations between agreeableness and (low) 
extraversion and the sum offered by the dictator.  Finally, Kurzban and Houser (2001) 
reported non-significant associations between Big Five personality traits and social 
preferences. Further studies have examined variation in social preferences using 
personality frameworks other than the five-factor model. For example, Boone, De 
Brabander, and van Witteloostuijn (1999) observed that the personality traits locus of 
control, self-monitoring, and sensation seeking had significant associations (r = .28 - 
.44) with levels of cooperative behaviour in a prisoners’ dilemma game. Scheres and 
Sanfey (2006) observed significant associations between BAS-Drive and BAS-
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Reward and (low) offers in a dictator games. And Swope, Cadigan, Schmitt, and 
Shupp (2008) reported no significant effects of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator on 
social preferences. 
These mixed results in studies using the five-factor framework, alongside 
results from studies using different personality measures, which are not directly 
comparable, suggest that, while individual differences may be important for 
understanding social preferences, more research is required. In particular, research 
addressing limitations of earlier studies will be critical to understanding the role of 
personality on social preferences. 
  
1.2 Limitations in previous research 
 There are a number of possible explanations for the mixed results described 
above. Firstly, much research has focused on just one or two experimental games, 
such as the dictator and ultimatum games; however, important confounds have been 
identified in these games which render choices ambiguous as to underlying 
motivations or preferences (Charness & Rabin, 2002). For example, rejection of a low 
offer in the ultimatum game can reflect difference aversion or retaliation. These 
distinct motives, in turn, confound potential underlying personality traits, such as 
neuroticism and agreeableness, respectively. Likewise, in the prisoners’ dilemma, a 
choice to defect can reflect aversion to differential outcomes, aversion to risk, or a 
self-regarding preference. These confounds can be mitigated by exploring a range of 
payoff pairings, varying absolute and relative payoff differences, as well as allowing 
multi-stage games (Charness & Rabin, 2002). Finally, and importantly, choices reflect 
expectations about the other player in addition to personal preferences. An example 
would be the expectation (or fear) that the other player will defect. Because of these 
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confounds in single games, personality is likely to have apparently divergent or null 
associations to preferences on different games because of the distinct ways in which 
each game might trigger personality-related preferences. 
 Secondly, the various personality instruments used in studies associating 
social preferences and personality have made it difficult to compare results and 
uncover personality-preference links. For example, Swope, Cadigan, Schmitt, and 
Shupp (2008) used the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (which does not tap neuroticism; 
McCrae & Costa, 1989), and Boone, De Brabander, and van Witteloostuijn (1999) 
used an assortment of scales: locus of control, self-monitoring, type-A behaviour, and 
sensation-seeking. While each of these measures may tap specific traits of relevance 
to social preferences, the core five-factor model has demonstrated broader coverage of 
stable human behaviour than any other measurement instrument (e.g. Costa & 
McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1993), and so provides a more comprehensive tool by 
which to understand putative trait influences on social preferences.  
 Finally, and most straightforwardly, research has seldom addressed the 
reliability of social preferences.  As recently noted by Ferguson, Heckman and Corr 
(2011), the stability of economic preferences still needs to be established. Although 
we do not think that this is the likely explanation for the mixed results, if reliability in 
choice behaviour is low (e.g. because participants choose randomly), this would 
explain both the high variability typically seen in games and the inconsistency of 
measured relationships with stable personality traits in previous research, as noted 
above.  
 To address these limitations, in the present study we measured social 
preference with Charness and Rabin’s (2002) set of dictator games (described in more 
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detail below) twice over a two-week interval, and utilised the full-spectrum NEO-PI-
R (Costa & McCrae, 1992) in order to gain a comprehensive assessment of 
personality. 
 
Here we have used a large set of games which are well-established in the 
experimental economics literature (Charness & Rabin, 2002). This mixture of games 
allows us to aggregate over many more choices than are commonly elicited from 
subjects and thus to eliminate common confounds between Pareto-damaging 
behaviour (behaviour that makes at least one person worse off without making anyone 
better off, in monetary terms), retaliation, and inequality reduction. These games also 
tap into the two primary factors which economic theorists have identified as critical 
for explaining social preferences: How much the other participants receive 
(comparison-based preferences; people will be less kind towards those who have 
more than themselves), and the perceived intentions of the other participants 
(intention-based preferences; people will be less kind towards those who have shown 
bad intentions). These factors have been separately identified by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002; see also 
Daruvala, 2010, for a review), but have so far only been discussed in terms of their 
influence on average behaviour: The factor structure of these games has not yet (to 
our knowledge) been examined.  
 
1.3 The Current Study  
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With regard to social preferences, we were agnostic about the underlying 
factor structure on account of the scarcity of individual differences work in this field 
to guide predictions. In addition to assessing the reliability of social preferences and 
examining the consistency of these preferences across a range of eighteen games, we 
made several predictions relating personality to social preferences. Concerning 
comparison-based preferences, we hypothesised that agreeableness would be 
positively associated with choices reflecting concern for the welfare of others, as well 
as positive expectations of others’ choices, on account of demonstrated links with 
empathy and trust (Jensen-Campbell & Graziano, 2001). Similarly, we predicted that 
neuroticism would associate negatively with concern for welfare of others, and 
expectations of others’ choosing selfishly, due to the contribution of facets such as 
hostility (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Finally, we hypothesised that openness would 
predict benevolent social preferences, and positive expectations of others’ choices, on 
account of relationships of openness to values of fairness and harm reduction (Lewis 
& Bates, 2011a). Regarding predictions concerning personality associations with 
intention-based preferences, we hypothesised that neuroticism and extraversion, with 
links to revengeful thoughts following a transgression (Maltby, Wood, Day, Kon, 
Colley, & Linley, 2008) and dominance behaviours (Nettle, 2005), respectively, 
would predict less concern for the welfare of others following a selfish choice.  
  
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
Seventy-five participants were recruited from an undergraduate participation 
pool: participants received partial course credit for attending as well as a financial 
remuneration based on choices made in the experimental tasks. Of the initial 75 
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participants, 71 returned for the second session. Additionally, four participants’ data 
were lost due to a data storage failure. Of the 67 remaining participants, 54 were 
female (mean age = 19; modal age =  18; range = 17 to 50; SD = 3.9 years). 
2.2 Measures 
2.2.1 Personality 
Five-factor model (FFM) personality traits were measured using the 240-item 
NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Participants completed the inventory at 
individual computer terminals. 
2.2.2 Games 
A set of six dictator and six response games (described below) were taken 
from Charness and Rabin (2002) and are named according to their convention (with 
the exception of Ed 128, which is derived from Berk 28 but was not in the original set 
of games). As an example of comparison-based preferences, in the game known as 
Berk 23 (see Figure 1), Player B chooses between an outcome in which Player A 
player gets £8 and Player B gets £2, versus an outcome in which each receives £0. As 
an example of an intention-based preference, in the game known as Berk 22 (see 
Figure 2), Player A can choose £3.75 for themselves and £10 for Player B, or let 
Player B choose between £4 for each player or £2.50 for Player A and £3.50 for 
themselves. Here, if Player A ‘enters’ the game and allows Player B to make the 
choice, Player A deprives Player B of a guaranteed £10. Of course, Player B may now 
choose the lower payoff for themselves (£3.50 rather than £4) in order to punish 
Player A (Player A would then receive £2.50 rather than £4). Participants played all 
response games both as Player B and as Player A.  
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---------- Insert Figure 1 about here ---------- 
---------- Insert Figure 2 about here ---------- 
 
Games are listed in Table 1 corresponding to the (fixed) order that they were 
played by the participants. Games are presented so that the prosocial choice for Player 
B is always on the left (although the games were counter-balanced when presented to 
the participants), with the exception of Berk 26, in which the total payoff is identical 
for both choices available to Player B. 
In order to explore the role of players’ expectations about the behaviour of 
others on their own choices, participants were asked to estimate the percentage of all 
other participants who would make the prosocial choice when acting as Player B in 
the relevant games. This was taken after they had made their choice in the role of 
Player A in the response games. Participants were informed that there would be a £10 
prize for the participant with the most accurate estimates of other players’ behaviour. 
 
---------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------- 
 
2.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in separate experimental cubicles. 
Participants were informed both when they signed up for the experiment and again at 
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the beginning of their first session that they would be required to return for the second 
half of the experiment in two weeks in order to obtain both course credit and 
monetary payment. Participants were paid at the end of the second session based on 
their rewards in one task from each of the two sessions chosen at random and this was 
common knowledge. 
Participants first played all six dictator games before playing all six response 
games as the second player and finally playing the same six response games as the 
first player (see Table 1). Participants were told that payoffs would be based on 
converting winnings from one game at random in each session into British pence (i.e. 
750 = £7.50). Participants were not told of their partners’ choices until the end of the 
second session, when they were paid. The NEO-PI-R was administered in two blocks: 
one at the end of the first session and one at the end of the second session. 
3. Results 
The proportions of choices made by participants for each game, and the 
expectations of other players’ behaviour, are summarised in Table 1. Descriptive 
statistics for the personality traits are detailed in Table 2. 
 
---------- Insert Table 2 about here ---------- 
 
3.1 Factor structure of social preferences 
  
 To our knowledge, the factor structure of social preferences has not previously 
been determined: Accordingly, we performed exploratory factor analysis on the game 
and expectation data. Because Charness and Rabin have proposed three parameters 
underlying social preferences we conducted FA to see whether behaviour our 18 
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games would reflect this as a 3-factor structure. Eigenvalues for the varimax rotated 
solution were (7.6, 4.3, 2.4, 1.8, 0.9,…), suggesting evidence for one factor in the 
scree plot. This was supported by an analysis of the factorial solution; the first two 
factors were very similar, with all but one variable loading positively on both the first 
and second factors (Berk31A had a -.03 loading on the first factor) and the third factor 
was not interpretable in terms of the Charness and Rabin structure. Jointly this 
suggested extracting one factor. The one-factor solution loaded positively on all items 
and accounted for 58% of the variance.  
We next aggregated game preferences into a single construct which we term 
the Prosocial Orientation Scale (POS). For simplicity and to avoid capitalising on 
chance factor loadings, POS scores were calculated as a sum of choices rather than 
from the factor loadings. POS scores were derived as follows: one point was awarded 
for each game on which the player chose the option where the total payoff (for both 
players) was largest, i.e. the prosocial choice, and, for expectations a score between 0 
and 1 was awarded representing the expectation of prosociality in other players. The 
POS demonstrated excellent internal-consistency (Cronbach’s α = .94) and high test-
retest reliability (across the two week interval; r = .84, p < .0001). 
 
3.2 Personality as a Predictor of Prosocial Orientation  
Having established that social preferences demonstrated high reliability and 
stability, we next examined the relationship of FFM traits to social preferences using 
linear modelling (multiple regression) with POS scores as the dependent variable and 
entering each of the FFM domains (as well as age and sex) as independent variables. 
This model accounted for 25.5% of variance in POS scores, with neuroticism (β = -
.33, p = .02), extraversion (β = -.32, p = .02), and openness to experience (β = .41, p = 
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.003) being significant predictors (see Table 3). Agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
sex, and age were not significant predictors and removing these variables did not 
significantly alter model fit (F = 1.46, p = .23) or the parameter estimates of the 
significant predictors (though we did not have high power to detect sex effects in the 
current study). Nor did the inclusion of facets improve the fit: when we added either 
the 18 facets from neuroticism, extraversion and openness (the significant predictors) 
or all 30 facets, the joint significance tests could not reject the null hypothesis of zero 
predictive power (F = 1.04, p = .44 and F = 1.46, p = 0.15, respectively). Pairwise 
interaction terms for all personality factors were non-significant. Similarly, moving 
from measuring POS based on a simple sum (as above) to a factor score revealed the 
same pattern of significance and made no meaningful difference to coefficient 
magnitudes: coefficients on neuroticism, extraversion, and openness went from -.33, -
.32 and .41 in the summation model to -.38, -.34 and .34 in the factor model, 
respectively. 
 
---------- Insert Table 3 about here ---------- 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
 
 The current study set out to determine whether, firstly, personality exerts an 
influence on social preferences in a series of simple games, and secondly, whether 
social preferences are stable over time. Behavioural stability in choices across 
sessions was high, suggesting that both choice behaviour and expectations of choice 
behaviour in our menu of games is underpinned by a stable trait disposition. 
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Our data also provide strong evidence that personality traits exert significant 
influences upon social preferences. Moreover, these personality effects were seen to 
influence a single dimension of behaviour – termed here the Prosocial Orientation 
Scale (POS). Openness to experience was a positive predictor of the POS, such that 
higher levels of openness predicted more benevolent behaviour, and expectations of 
more benevolent behaviour. Extraversion and neuroticism were negative predictors of 
prosocial preferences, such that more introverted and more emotionally stable 
individuals were more likely to make benevolent choices, and to expect others to do 
the same. These results confirm and extend the findings of Lönnqvist, Verkasalo and 
Walkowitz (2011), who found that high openness and low neuroticism predicted co-
operation in a prisoners’ dilemma game. These findings are in tension with some 
previous research reporting that high neuroticism relates to more benevolent social 
preferences (Hirsh & Peterson, 2009). However, Lönnqvist, Verkasalo and Walkowitz 
(2011) note that Hirsh and Peterson (2009) used hypothetical stakes, whereas their 
own work showed that the relationship between social preferences and personality 
breaks down in the absence of monetary stakes (see also Kang, Rangel, Camus, & 
Camerer, 2011 on the importance of using real payoffs).  
 The present results run contrary to one of the core hypotheses of the study, 
namely that agreeableness would be a positive predictor of prosocial preferences. This 
null-result is striking in light of agreeableness being characterised as a trait indexing 
empathy and concern for social welfare (Jensen-Campbell & Graziano, 2001) and so 
having intuitive links to benevolent social preferences. While this result is puzzling, 
recent work has suggested that (at least) two distinct mechanisms motivate prosocial 
behaviours: a fairness-based system and a compassion-based system (Singer & 
Steinbeis, 2009). As such, it is plausible that the laboratory environment (participants 
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completed the experiment alone in lab rooms) did not suitably invoke empathic 
concern for other participants thus not ‘activating’ the compassion-based system; a 
system which is likely to be related to agreeableness. Openness, however, with robust 
links to liberal political values (McCrae, 1996), may be more closely aligned to the 
fairness-based motivational system (Lewis & Bates, 2011a), perhaps explaining the 
observed association between openness and benevolent social preferences. As such, 
future work extending these findings in more ecologically valid environments is 
recommended.  
The finding that a common factor underpinned choice behaviour across our 
games is of considerable theoretical interest because it suggests that variation in social 
preferences can be described by a single parameter. It was noted in the introduction 
that social preference theories generally posit that the weight which agents place on 
each other’s payoffs depends on whether those others have a higher or lower payoff 
than the agent, and also on whether the recipient seems to have good intentions. The 
model of behaviour posited in Charness & Rabin (2002), for example, has three 
distinct parameters to reflect these contingencies. Our analysis suggests that these 
parameters can be collapsed into a single dimension, because the participants who 
were most likely to sacrifice those who had a lower payoff than themselves were also 
the most likely to sacrifice for those who had a higher payoff, and for those who had 
(or hadn’t) shown bad intentions. This supports other work indicating that a common 
underlying factor (in part) influences social preferences (Eisenberg et al., 2002; Lewis 
& Bates, 2011b; Knafo et al., 2008). 
Specific limitations require mention. Firstly, females were overrepresented in 
our sample. While no sex effects were evident, it would be useful to extend these 
results to a sample with greater power to detect such effects. Secondly, in this work, 
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we restricted our analyses to the robust common prosocial orientation factor. Future 
work should explore the possibility that additional preference-factors can be reliably 
assessed. These might tap expectations about other players’ behaviour, and sensitivity 
to equality of outcomes (in addition to general outcome maximisation indexed by our 
general factor). 
In conclusion, the results suggest that differences in behaviour on simple 
games are stable, that they reflect a general preference for prosocial outcomes, and 
that they have a significant link to personality traits of extraversion, neuroticism, and 
openness. Future work seeking to identify trait associations with social preferences is 
recommended to place less emphasis on confounded games, such as the prisoners’ 
dilemma and the ultimatum game, and instead make greater use of games that avoid 
such drawbacks. Extensions to our preliminary investigation of the psychometric 
structure of social preferences will also be valuable. 
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Table 1. Game payoffs and the proportions of participants making each choice. 
  Out Enter Left Right 
Dictator games      
Berk 17  B chooses (750,375) vs. (400,400)   .16 .84 
Berk 23 B chooses (800,200) vs. (0,0)   .67 .33 
Berk 29  B chooses (750,400) vs. (400,400)   .38 .62 
Berk 15  B chooses  (600,600) vs. (200,700)   .50 .50 
Berk 26  B chooses  (400,400) vs. (0,800)   .35 .65 
Ed 128  B chooses (125,125) vs. (75,125)   .72 .28 
      
Response games      
Berk 13 A chooses (550,550) or lets .86 .14   
 B choose  (750,375) vs. (400,400)   .16 .84 
 Expectations of B   .19 .81 
Berk 30 A chooses (400,1200) or lets .49 .51   
 B choose (400,200) vs. (0,0)   .70 .30 
 Expectations of B   .65 .35 
Berk 31 A chooses (750,750) or lets .78 .22   
 B choose (800,200) vs. (0,0)   .57 .43 
 Expectations of B   .57 .43 
Berk 19 A chooses (700,200) or lets .75 .25   
 B choose  (600,600) vs. (200,700)   .46 .54 
 Expectations of B   .29 .71 
Berk 22 A chooses (375,1000) or lets .31 .69   
 B choose (400,400) vs. (250,350)   .80 .20 
 Expectations of B   .80 .20 
Berk 28 A chooses (100,1000) or lets .31 .69   
 B choose (125,125) vs. (75,125)   .65 .35 
 Expectations of B   .41 .59 
Note. Numbers in parentheses show (Player A, Player B) payoffs in British pence; 
Out = The proportion of Player Bs who opted to stay ‘out’ of the game by choosing 
the available payoffs and thus depriving Player A of making a choice; Enter = The 
proportion of Player Bs who ‘entered’ the game, thus allowing Player A to make a 
choice between the available payoffs; Left = The proportion of participants choosing 
the payoffs to the left; Right = The proportion of participants choosing the payoffs to 
the right; Expectations of B = Player A’s expectations of the average B choice. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the five personality traits 
 Mean SD 
Neuroticism 57.64 9.87 
Extraversion 55.12 8.61 
Openness 56.03 7.02 
Agreeableness 47.20 8.52 
Conscientiousness 41.99 8.67 
Note. Means are t-scores derived from manual norms  
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Table 3. Personality predictors of the Prosocial Orientation Scale (standardised 
coefficients are presented) for Model 1 and Model 2. 
 βModel 1 βModel 2 
Neuroticism -.33* -.38** 
Extraversion -.32* -.35* 
Openness .41** .36** 
Agreeableness .17  
Conscientiousness -.16  
Age -.15  
Sex (male = 0) -.17  
Multiple-R
2
 .26 .18 
Note. N = 67; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01 
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Figure 1. Sample screenshot of the Berk 23 game as presented to participants 
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Figure 2. Sample screenshot of the Berk 22 game as presented to Player A 
 
